Office of the Attorney General

SLIP OPINION

AG number: 9092Style: Wood vs. State
Jurisdiction: 1st DCADate issued: September 23, 1998
AG HEADNOTE

Moped defined as motor vehicle
A moped is a motor vehicle and operators therefore are required to have a valid driver's license, the 1st DCA held.
The court affirmed the defendant's adjudication for operating a moped while his license was revoked. The court followed the 4th DCA's recent holding in Soto vs. State, which also held that a moped is a motor vehicle under Chapter 322 of the Florida Statutes. The 1st DCA certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court.


THOMAS WOOD, IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
Appellant,
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
v. FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
CASE NO. 97-4900
Appellee.
_________________________/

Opinion filed September 23, 1998.

An appeal from the County Court for Okaloosa County.
William Frye, III, Judge.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; L. Michael Billmeier, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.


WEBSTER, J.
Appellant was charged in county court with driving a motor vehicle while his license was revoked, in violation of section 322.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). He filed a sworn motion to dismiss in which he asserted that he had been driving a moped at the time of the alleged offense; and argued that, because a moped is not a "motor vehicle" for purposes of section 322.34, no offense had been committed. The state filed a traverse to the motion, contending that a moped is a "motor vehicle" for purposes of the statute. Following a hearing, the trial court agreed with the state and, accordingly, denied the motion. Appellant then entered a plea of no contest, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The trial court adjudicated appellant guilty, and placed him on probation. The court also certified the following question to this
court as one of great public importance:
We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(4).
We answer the certified question in the affirmative, based upon the holding and analysis of the recent decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Soto v. State, 711 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). We do not address appellant's argument, made for the first time in his reply brief, that section 322.34 is unconstitutional to the extent that it is intended to apply to the operation of a moped. See RIS Inv. Group, Inc. v. Department of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 695 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 698 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1997).
AFFIRMED.
JOANOS and ALLEN, JJ., CONCUR.