Office of the Attorney General

SLIP OPINION

AG number: 7029Style: Almeida vs. State (Ingangiola murder)
Jurisdiction: Florida Supreme CourtDate issued: July 8, 1999
AG HEADNOTE

Officer's duty to answer question about rights
Police officers questioning a suspect must respond to a clear question regarding the suspect's rights with a good-faith attempt to provide accurate information before they may continue the interrogation, the Florida Supreme Court held.
The court, in a 4-3 decision, reversed the murder conviction and vacated the death sentence Osvaldo Almeida received for the 1993 murder of Chiquita Counts in Fort Lauderdale. After Almeida confessed in preliminary questioning to the Counts murder and two others, officers began a recorded interview by asking Almeida - who had previously waived his Miranda rights - if he was willing to talk without a lawyer present. Almeida responded, "Well, what good is an attorney going to do?" The officers ignored the question and went on with the interrogation. The justices said Almeida's question was not rhetorical and required a good-faith response, and because it was not answered Almeida's confession should not have been admitted.
"(W)e hold that if, at any point during custodial interrogation, a suspect asks a clear question concerning his or her rights, the officer must stop the interview and make a good-faith effort to give a simple and straightforward answer. To do otherwise - i.e., to give an evasive answer, or to skip over the question, or to override or "steamroll" the suspect - is to actively promote the very coercion that (case law) was intended to dispel. A suspect who has been ignored or overridden concerning a right will be reluctant to exercise that right freely. Once the officer properly answers the question, the officer may then resume the interview (provided of course that the defendant in the meantime has not invoked his or her rights). Any statement obtained in violation of this proscription violates the Florida Constitution and cannot be used by the State," the court said.
However, the court in a separate opinion affirmed Almeida's conviction for the 1993 murder of Sunrise restaurant manager Frank Ingangiola. The court reversed Almeida's death sentence and ordered a life sentence without parole for at least 25 years, citing extensive evidence of Almeida's brutal childhood and mental health problems and calling the case "one of the most mitigated murders the Court has reviewed."

Supreme Court of Florida

____________
No. 89,432
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OSVALDO ALMEIDA,
Appellant,
Cross-Appellee,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee,
Cross-Appellant.


[July 8, 1999]


SHAW, J.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty on Osvaldo Almeida. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We affirm the conviction but vacate the death sentence and remand for imposition of a life sentence without possibility of parole for twenty-five years.
During the early morning hours of November 15, 1993, Osvaldo Almeida and Louis Salmon met several friends at Higgy's restaurant and ordered a pitcher of beer. When Almeida started to take a drink, the manager, Frank Ingargiola, came to the table and grabbed the glass out of his hand. Almeida was underage (he was twenty years old at the time) and had been kicked out of the restaurant before for drinking. Ingargiola told him this night to leave and not come back. Almeida was acutely embarrassed by the incident, and several hours later he obtained a .44 caliber handgun, returned to Higgy's, and sometime after 4:30 a.m. shot Ingargiola. Almeida later told friends that he had committed the murder, and when he was arrested several days later police found the murder weapon in his car. He confessed to police.
Almeida was charged with first-degree murder, and during the guilt phase of the trial he contended that he was insane at the time of the crime. Family members and mental health experts testified concerning his extraordinarily brutal upbringing in Brazil, and two mental health experts testified that he could not distinguish right from wrong at the time of the crime. In rebuttal, the State presented two experts who testified that Almeida knew right from wrong at the time of the crime. Almeida was convicted as charged.
During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence of Almeida's first-degree murder convictions for killing two prostitutes in the weeks preceding the present crime. In mitigation, the defense presented testimony of family members attesting to Almeida's abusive childhood and testimony of several mental health experts attesting to his unstable mental state. The jury recommended death by a seven to five vote and the judge imposed a sentence of death based on two aggravating circumstances, three statutory mitigating circumstances, and eight nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Almeida appeals, raising fifteen issues, and the State cross-appeals, raising a single issue.
Almeida's first claim concerns a discussion that took place during the State's closing argument in the guilt phase. The claim focuses on three statements made by the prosecutor:
(Emphasis added.) Following the bench conference, the prosecutor then made this statement to the jury without objection:
Almeida now claims that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor's first statement above. We agree.
The prosecutor's initial comment was an incorrect statement of the law. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 37. The trial court thus erred in overruling the objection. We find the error harmless, however, on this record: (1) The misstatement was presented to the jury in the context of closing argument by an advocate, not in the context of an instruction by the court; (2) the misstatement was an innocent one--the prosecutor was struggling with a subtle rule of law that is difficult to articulate; (3) although the prosecutor repeated the incorrect statement to the jury (the second statement above), he minutes later read the proper instruction (the third statement above); (4) immediately following the prosecutor's second improper statement, the court announced before the jury that (a) the court would be instructing them on the law, (b) they were to follow only its instructions, and (c) what the lawyers say is neither evidence nor law; (5) before the jury retired, the court also read the standard instruction to the jury; and (6) the jury took a copy of the standard instruction into the jury room during deliberations. We find the error harmless on this record.
To the extent that Almeida now complains that the court erred in the way it addressed this issue after defense counsel asked to approach the bench, we disagree. The record shows that following the second statement above, it was defense counsel who led the discussion at the bench and who suggested the ultimate remedy, i.e., that the prosecutor read the standard instruction to the jury ("Why don't you just read it?"). This is exactly what the prosecutor did. Defense counsel then seemed satisfied--he asked for no curative instruction or other palliative measure and filed no objection. The trial continued in a routine fashion. The trial court had no notice whatsoever that defense counsel was anything but pleased with the resolution. We find no abuse of discretion. See generally Hooper v. State, 476 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1985).
Almeida next claims error on several points. During the course of the trial, the following transpired: (1) The prosecutor asked Louis Salmon if he was referring in his testimony to an incident involving a knife; (2) Almeida's employer testified that Almeida had told him that he had a vision of killing and felt no remorse; (3) Salmon testified that appellant had told him that Black Talon bullets make a big exit wound; and (4) the prosecutor asked Dr. Seligson if Almeida was a gang member. Almeida now claims that the court erred on these points. We disagree. Our review of the record shows the following: (1) the prosecutor's question concerning the knife incident was improper but harmless (the question was brief and no details of the incident were discussed); (2) the claim concerning the employer's statement was not preserved (Almeida did not object); (3) the discussion of Black Talon ammunition was relevant to show premeditation (the bullets would make death more likely); and (4) the prosecutor's question concerning Almeida's possible gang affiliation was fair inquiry (the witness had stated that a gang had targeted Almeida and was beating him up). Accordingly, we find the issue raised in the first part of this claim to be harmless error and the remainder of this claim to be without merit.
During redirect examination of State witness Louis Salmon, the following discussion transpired:
Almeida now claims that the court erred in overruling the defense objections. We disagree.
The above testimony related Salmon's opinion on three points: (1) Almeida knew that what he had done was wrong; (2) Almeida believed he had been a bad boy and it was time for him to pay his dues; and (3) Almeida was prepared to face the consequences. Generally, testimony is admissible on redirect that tends to clarify cross-examination testimony. See Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1986). The present record shows that the above testimony was elicited following cross-examination by defense counsel that called for Salmon's opinion on virtually identical matters. Thus, the above discussion was a fair response to Salmon's testimony on cross-examination. We find no error.
The State introduced as Exhibit No. 10 an autopsy photo of the victim that depicted the gutted body cavity. Almeida claims that this was error. We agree. Although this Court has stated that "[t]he test for admissibility of photographic evidence is relevancy rather than necessity," Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. 1996), this standard by no means constitutes a carte blanche for the admission of gruesome photos. To be relevant, a photo of a deceased victim must be probative of an issue that is in dispute. In the present case, the medical examiner testified that the photo was relevant to show the trajectory of the bullet and nature of the injuries. Neither of these points, however, was in dispute. Admission of the inflammatory photo thus was gratuitous. We find the error harmless, however, in light of the minor role the photo played in the State's case. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).
Almeida was picked up by police November 29, 1993, and taken to headquarters where he was read his rights, signed a waiver form, and then confessed to the murder of Frank Ingargiola. Detective Mink later sought to begin a formal recorded interrogation session and the following taped discussion transpired:
Almeida then confessed again to the Ingargiola murder (and to the murders of the two prostitutes, Marilyn Leath and Chiquita Counts). Almeida now claims that the court erred in failing to suppress the taped statement. The State, on the other hand, contends that this issue is controlled by State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997). We disagree.
We recently addressed the admissibility of this taped statement in a companion case, Almeida v. State, No. 89,402 (Fla. July 8, 1999) ("Almeida I") (addressing Almeida's conviction for the murder of Chiquita Counts). We first determined that Almeida's utterance ("Well, what good is an attorney going to do?") referred to his right to counsel and was a bona fide question calling for an answer, and we observed that this question was fundamentally different from the statement in Owen:
Almeida I, slip op. at 9. We concluded that under Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992), police must make a good-faith effort to answer a clear question concerning a suspect's rights:
Almeida I, slip op. at 11-12. Finally, we held that police should have answered Almieda's question:
Almeida I, slip op. at 12. Because we were unable to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous admission of the taped statement in Almeida I did not contribute to the verdict, we reversed Almeida's conviction for the murder of Chiquita Counts. Id. at 14.
The present case is different--the conviction here is supported by copious evidence in addition to the improperly admitted taped statement: The record shows that as well as confessing on tape, Almeida also confessed to Detective Mink prior to giving the taped statement ("he just threw his hands up and said, I fucking killed him"); Almeida also confessed to Louis Salmon, Eddie Cooper, and Sergio Hoggro, all of whom testified at trial; and the gun found in Almeida's car when he was arrested was conclusively identified as the murder weapon. We conclude on this record that there is no reasonable possibility that admission of the taped statement affected the verdict. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986) ("The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict."). We find the error harmless.
In his next claim, Almeida notes that during the course of these proceedings, defense counsel brought three points to the court's attention: (1) Prior to trial, a woman accompanying the victim's wife allegedly said to the defendant, "You should fry, you bastard;" (2) during the medical examiner's testimony at trial, the victim's mother allegedly began to cry; and (3) during Dr. Macaluso's testimony, someone in the audience allegedly made a sarcastic remark ("Who cares."). Almeida now claims that the court erred in failing to grant a mistrial based on these incidents. We disagree. The record shows the following: (1) The jury was not exposed to the pretrial comment; (2) although neither the prosecutor nor the judge heard the mother sobbing, the court offered to give a curative instruction; and (3) although neither the judge nor the bailiff, who was sitting "right there," heard the "who cares" comment, the court instructed the bailiff to tell the spectators to refrain from making such comments. We find no error. See generally Gorby v. State, 630 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1993).
Almeida claims that the trial court erred in finding that CCP was established. We agree. A trial court's ruling on an aggravating circumstance will be sustained on review as long as the court applied the right rule of law and its ruling is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. See Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1997). Competent substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence, and we assess the record evidence for its sufficiency only, not its weight.
The present record shows the following: (1) Several witnesses testified that Almeida had calmed down in the hours following the incident at Higgy's and evinced no plan to commit the crime; (2) the trial court found that Almeida had a history of alcohol abuse and had been drinking on the night of the crime; (3) Almeida in his own statement to police described the killing as an impulsive act committed shortly after he had left his friends and got drunk by himself; (4) the trial court found that both mental health mitigators had been established, i.e., that Almeida was extremely disturbed at the time of the crime and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired; (5) the record is replete with testimony of witnesses attesting to Almeida's lack of impulse control due to his brutal childhood in Brazil; (6) witnesses established that Almeida was particularly unstable at the time of the crime because of his recent marital separation and pending divorce. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the record evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding of heightened premeditation. Accordingly, the court erred in finding CCP.
Almeida next claims that his death sentence is disproportionate. We agree. The Court in State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), held that the death penalty is reserved for only the most indefensible of crimes:
Id. at 8. We later explained: "Our law reserves the death penalty only for the most aggravated and least mitigated murders." Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274, 278 (Fla. 1993). Thus, our inquiry when conducting proportionality review is two-pronged: We compare the case under review to others to determine if the crime falls within the category of both (1) the most aggravated, and (2) the least mitigated of murders.
In the present case, as noted above, only a single aggravator (commission of a prior violent felony) applies. As a general rule, "death is not indicated in a single-aggravator case where there is substantial mitigation." Jones v. State, 705 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1998). Nevertheless, this Court has affirmed the death penalty in single-aggravator cases where a prior murder was involved. See, e.g., Ferrell v. State, 680 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1996) (affirming death sentence where sole aggravator was prior second-degree murder); Duncan v. State, 619 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1993) (affirming death sentence where sole aggravator was prior second-degree murder). The present case involves two prior first-degree murders. Thus, the first prong of the above standard appears to be satisfied.
The trial court additionally found three statutory and many nonstatutory mitigators, including a brutal childhood and vast mental health mitigation. This Court has reversed the death penalty in cases where the extent of mitigation was comparable or less, even in the face of significant aggravation. See, e.g., Robertson v. State, 699 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1997); Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1990); Fitzpatrick v. State, 527 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1988). In addition to the mental health mitigation in the present case, the defendant was twenty years old at the time of the crime, and the present crime and the prior capital felonies all arose from a single brief period of marital crisis that spanned six weeks. We note that the jury vote was seven to five. On this record, we cannot conclude that the present crime is one of the least mitigated murders. In fact, the record shows just the opposite--i.e., that this is one of the most mitigated murders the Court has reviewed. Accordingly, we find Almeida's death sentence disproportionate.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Almeida's conviction and vacate his death sentence. We remand for imposition of a life sentence without possibility of parole for twenty-five years.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., and KOGAN, Senior Justice, concur.
HARDING, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., and OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur.


NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.

HARDING, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I would affirm the conviction and sentence of death in this case. I disagree with the majority's opinion for several reasons. First, I disagree that the trial court erred in admitting Almeida's taped confession. Second, I believe that the record supports a finding of CCP. Finally, I do not think that the death sentence is disproportionate.
I. Almeida's confession.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court erred in admitting Almeida's taped statement. For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Almeida v. State, No. 89,402 (Fla. July 8, 1998), I would find that Almeida's statement was admissible under Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), and State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997).
II. CCP
I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor (CCP) should be stricken. In a well-reasoned sentencing order, the trial judge set forth the basis for finding CCP in this case:
I agree with the trial judge that there was sufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the CCP aggravating factor exists.
In Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994), this Court outlined the necessary elements for a finding of CCP: (1) the murder was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage, (2) the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit murder before the killing, (3) the defendant exhibited heightened premeditation, and (4) the defendant had no pretense of legal or moral justification. In striking CCP, the majority opinion states:
I respectfully disagree. The majority's bare-boned analysis of this issue is neither pertinent to the matter of heightened premeditation nor is it supported by case law.
In Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1992), this Court stated, "To establish the heightened premeditation necessary for a finding of [CCP], the State must demonstrate that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to kill." The facts in the present case reveal that after being kicked out of the restaurant, Almeida attempted to lure the victim outside in order to confront him. When this failed, Almeida told his friends of his intent to kill the victim. Almeida later returned to the restaurant and waited until 4:30 a.m. for the victim to exit the restaurant, whereupon Almeida shot and killed the victim. All of this demonstrates that Almeida had a careful plan and prearranged design to murder the victim. On this record, I fail to see how the majority can conclude that the facts are insufficient to support a finding of heightened premeditation.
III. Proportionality of the Death Sentence
Finally, I disagree with the majority that the death penalty is disproportionate in this case. The trial judge found that two aggravating factors were established in this case: (1) CCP and (2) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony (the Leath and Counts murders). The trial judge found that three statutory mitigating factors were established in this case and gave each little weight: (1) age of the defendant, (2) influence of extreme or emotional disturbance, and (3) impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct and conform conduct to the requirements of the law. The trial judge found that eight nonstatutory mitigating factors were established and assigned them some, little, or very little weight.
In reaching its conclusion regarding proportionality, the majority did not consider CCP. As stated earlier, I disagree with the majority that CCP was not established in this case. Even without CCP, I still would find that the death penalty is proportionate in this case. This Court has previously upheld the death penalty in single aggravator cases. See Ferrell v. State, 680 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. 1996); Duncan v. State, 619 So. 2d 279, 284 (Fla. 1993). In Ferrell, this Court stated:
680 So. 2d at 391. Similarly, in the present case, although the court found that a number of mitigating circumstances were established, it assigned little or very little weight to each, with the exception of the nonstatutory mitigator of difficult childhood, which was given some weight. In contrast, the aggravator in question is very weighty, especially in light of the fact that both previous first-degree murders were committed within five weeks of the present case.
If the majority believes that the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the aggravators and mitigators, then this should be explicitly stated in the opinion. But based on this record and the trial court's findings in the sentencing order, it cannot be said that the death penalty is disproportionate.
Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction of guilt and sentence of death in this case.
WELLS, J., and OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur.

Notice of An Appeal and Cross-Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,

Paul Backman, Judge - Case No. 93-20808CF10A


Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Gary Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,

for Appellant, Cross-Appellee


Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and David M. Schultz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,

for Appellee, Cross-Appellant