CAR SEARCH BASED ON TRAFFIC CITATION

The United States Supreme Court ruled that police officers cannot automatically search a car after making a routine traffic stop to issue a citation.

Conclusion

Troopers are reminded that in order to conduct a lawful search, you need consent from the driver or owner if present; or you need probable cause to search; or you need an arrest in which the search is incident to the arrest.

Analysis

An Iowa policeman stopped petitioner Knowles for speeding and issued him a citation rather than arresting him. The officer then conducted a full search of the car, without either Knowles’ consent or probable cause, found marijuana and a "pot pipe," and arrested Knowles for violating state laws dealing with controlled substances.

Before trial on state drug charges, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that because he had not been arrested, the search could not be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" exception recognized in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). At a hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer testified that he had neither Knowles’ consent to search nor probable cause to search. The officer relied on Iowa statute §321.485(1)a, which provides that an officer may arrest the person and take the person before a magistrate for a traffic violation. The statute also provides for the more common practice of issuing the violator a traffic citation in lieu of a custodial arrest. Section 805.1(1), Iowa Statutes, provides officers who have cause to believe that an individual has violated any traffic or motor vehicle equipment law, "does not affect the officer’s authority to conduct a lawful search." The trial court denied the motion. In affirming, the State Supreme Court applied its bright-line "search incident to citation" exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, reasoning that so long as the officer had probable cause to make a custodial arrest, there need not in fact have been an arrest.

The issue before the court was "whether the search at issue, authorized as it was by state law, nonetheless it violates the Fourth Amendment." The United States Supreme Court in an unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice William Rehnquist held that even though the search was authorized by state law, nonetheless violates the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.

In its analysis, the Court opined that there are two historical reasons for the "search incident to arrest" exceptions. The first exception involves the "need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody." While the Court stated that the threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest, it did reiterate its position that the concern for safety during a routine traffic stop may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car. However, this alone does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full field-type search. Even without the search authority, Iowa urges that officers have other independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger.

The second reason for the search incident to arrest exception is the need to discover and preserve evidence. The Court opined that this need does not exist in a traffic stop, for once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. Iowa’s argument that a "search incident to citation" is justified because a suspect may try to hide evidence of his identity or of other crimes is unpersuasive. An officer may arrest a driver if he is not satisfied with the identification furnished, and the possibility that an officer would stumble onto evidence of an unrelated offense seems remote.

The court acknowledged the bright-line rule it established in Robinson for searches after an arrest, but said, "Here we are asked to extend that 'bright line rule' to a situation where the concern for officer safety is not present to the same extent and the concern for destruction or loss of property is not present at all. We decline to do so."

Prepared by:
Peter N. Stoumbelis
Assistant General Counsel

Approved by:
Enoch J. Whitney
General Counsel